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Commentary
"The Awful Discretion":
The Impeachment
Experience in the States
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that in these uncertain times the processes
of government should break down or that numerous public offi-
cials should yield to corruption and faithlessness in office. The
remarkable thing is that in times like these we have had so few
instances of individual apostasy among our public men.1
These words, written over forty years before the recent
phenomenon known as "Watergate," illustrate an enduring problem
of American government. If this is a nation where no one is above
the law, there must be some procedure available to bring about
the removal of a public official who is incompetent or corrupt. This
need must be balanced against the necessary independence of the
officeholder and his freedom from partisan, unjust accusations.
The procedure adopted by the framers of the Federal Constitu-
tion, and ultimately by forty-nine states, was impeachment, 2 a two-
stage process. First, a member of the lower house of the legisla-
ture who thinks an officer has committed acts warranting his
impeachment proposes this to the house, which then reviews the
evidence. If a sufficient number of the representatives concur,
articles of impeachment are drawn up setting out the charges. The
vote required to impeach varies from state to state,3 but if the
1. Limbaugh, Impeachment, 2 Mo. B.J. 5, 6 (1931) [hereinafter cited as
IAmbaugh, Impeachment].
2. Oregon is the only state which has no constitutional provision for im-
peachment. The constitution does provide as follows:
Public officers shall not be impeached; but incompetency, cor-
ruption, malfeasance or delinquency in office may be tried in
the same manner as criminal offenses, and judgment may be
given of dismissal from office, and such further punishment
as may have been prescribed by law.
ORE. CONST. art. 7, § 6.
3. The constitutions of Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont require a two-thirds
vote of the legislators to impeach. See ALAs. CONST. art. II, § 20; DEL.
92 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
necessary number of representatives concur on any article, the
officer has at that point been impeached. The second stage consists
of a trial, generally conducted before the upper house of the legis-
lature, 4 whose members act as judges and are under oath.5  The
proceedings are conducted substantially like a judicial trial. 6
Following presentation of the evidence and the closing argu-
CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17; IND. CONST. art. VI, §
7; Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 49; R.I. CONST. art. XI, § 1; S.C. CONST. art.
XV, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 17; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 53.
The following state constitutional provisions require a majority
vote of the legislators to impeach: ARiz. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1;
COLO. CoNST. art. XIII, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14; MD. CONST. art.
III, § 26; MIcH. CONST. art. XI, § 7; MrNN. CoNsT. art. IV, § 14; MONT.
CoNsT. art. V, § 16; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 17; NEV. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1; N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 3, cl. 2; N.M. CONsT. art. IV, § 35; N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 24; N.D. CONST. art. XIV, § 194; OHIO CONST. art.
I, § 23; S.D. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. V, § 1; Wis.
CoNsT. art. VII, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. III, § 17.
The following state constitutional provisions contain no require-
ment as to the vote needed to impeach: ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 173;
ARK. CONST. art. XV, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 17; CONN. CONST.
art. IX, §§ 1-2; GA. CONST. § 2-1803; HAWAII CONsT. art. III, § 20;
IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 19; NANe. CONST. art.
II, § 27; Ky. CoNsT. §§ 66, 67; LA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2; ME. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 1, § 8; MASS. CONsT. art. VIII, pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. VII,
§§ 1-3; N.H. CoNsT. art. XVII, pt. 2; N.C. CONsT. art. IV, §4; OKLA.
CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-5; PA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-5; TENN. CONST. art. V,
§§1-4; Tsx. CONST. art. XV, §§ 1-5; VA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 17; W. VA.
CONST. art. IV, §9.
4. In four states the court of impeachment is a body other than the upper
house of the legislature. ALAS. CONST. art. II, § 20 provides that
impeachment trials shall be conducted by the house of representatives.
Mo. CONST. art. 7, § 2 provides that the state supreme court shall try
impeachments; when the governor or a supreme court justice is on
trial, the senate selects a body of seven eminent jurists to conduct the
trial. NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 17 provides that the court of impeachment
shall consist of the state supreme court; when a supreme court justice
is on trial, the impeachment court will consist of all of the district
judges of the state. N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 24 provides that the court
of impeachment shall consist of the senate and the judges of the court
of appeals.
5. The form of oath administered to the senators in the impeachment trial
of Governor David Butler is set out in IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF DAVID
BUTLER, GOVERNOR OF NEBRASKA (Tribune Steam Book and Job Print-
ing House 1871) [hereinafter cited as IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF DAVID
BUTLER].
6. "Although the location, the judges and the atmosphere in an impeach-
ment trial are somewhat different than in a criminal proceeding, it
has been argued that all of the procedural matters necessary for a fair
trial are applicable." Story, Joseph Story on the Impeachment of Pub-
lic Officials, 19 ILL. L. REV. 45 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Story, Pub-
lic Officials].
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ments, the senate votes upon each of the articles of impeachment.'
If any one receives the necessary vote, the official is declared con-
victed. The senate then declares its judgment. This is limited by
most constitutions to removing the official from office and disqual-
ifying him from holding any office of trust in the state again.8
State constitutional provisions relating to impeachment are
important, but have not been the source of a great amount of liti-
gation. However, some specific questions have arisen in nearly
every proceeding and understanding them provides a clearer com-
prehension of the impeachment process. This article will focus upon
six such questions: Is resignation or the end of a term a bar to
impeachment? What are impeachable offenses? Do the limitations
on the subject matter of legislation and the time of the sessions
apply to impeachments? Does the pardoning power apply to im-
peachments? Can an official be impeached for acts committed dur-
ing a previous term of office? Is an impeached officer suspended
from office?
IL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To better understand the American impeachment process it must
be looked at in its historical perspective. It was an adaptation of
a procedure which was used in Great Britain in the late 14th cen-
tury. The House of Commons had the power of impeachment; the
House of Lords had the duty to try the case and render judgment. 9
Impeachment in Great Britain was similar to indictment by
grand jury or by information 9 and the trials were criminal pro-
7. The following constitutional provisions specify that a two-thirds vote
of the members present is required to convict an official: CoNN.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; FLA. CoNsT. art. III, § 17; GA. CoNsT. § 2-1704;
IOwA CoNsT. art. III, § 19; Ky. CoNsT. § 67; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt.
2, § 6; MiNN. CoNsT. art. IV, § 14; Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 52; N.Y.
CoNsT. art. VI, § 24; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 4; OKLA. CoNsT. art. VIII,
§ 4; TEX. CoNsT. art. XV, § 3; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 54; Wis. CONST.
art. VII, § 1.
In Missouri, a five-sevenths vote of either the supreme court or the
special commission is required to convict. See Mo. CONST. art. VII,
§ 2.
8. The judgment of the court of impeachment is limited to removal from
office in the following state constitutional provisions: ALAs. CONST.
art. II, § 20; IND. CONST. art. 6, § 7; MIcH. CONST. art. XI, § 7; Mo.
CONST. art. VII, § 3; OKLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 5; R.I. CONST. art. XI,§ 3; S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 3. ALA. CONST. art. 7, § 176 limits thejudgment to removal and disqualification for the term for which the
officer was elected or appointed.
9. Limbaugh, Impeachment, supra note 1, at 6.
10. The nature of the proceeding in Great Britain has been examined and
the conclusion reached that:
94 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
ceedings, since the House of Lords had the power to remove the
official from office, and to impose stiff fines, prison sentences, or
even death."
The framers of the American Constitution had the English
experience in mind when they drafted the sections dealing with
impeachment. The terms "impeachment" and "treason, bribery, or
other high crimes and misdemeanors" were borrowed from the
English law.12  The English division of functions in the impeach-
ment process was incorporated into the American scheme; the
House of Representatives and the Senate fulfill the same roles as
the Houses of Commons and Lords, respectively. 3
The American framers made several revisions in the process.
First, and foremost, they separated impeachment from any subse-
quent criminal prosecution. Noting the heated, partisan nature of
most of the British proceedings, they believed it best to limit the
judgment of the Senate to removal from office and disqualification,
and to leave any further punishment, such as fines or imprisonment,
to the regular criminal justice system.' 4  Second, a change was
[t] he effect of an impeachment, like that of an indictment, is
simply that there is apparent reason to believe that there has
been a criminal violation of the laws by the individual im-
peached. He may in proper cases be arrested and held in cus-
tody or required to give security. The law still presumes his
innocence, and can do no more than to take such steps as may
be necessary to render his attendance at the trial certain. The
trial must be conducted in accordance with the rules of evi-
dence observed in the ordinary courts; the person impeached
can only be convicted of a crime known to the law; the pun-
ishment follows that attached to the same crime by the ordi-
nary courts. Forfeiture of rights can occur only after convic-
tion. Impeachments, like indictments, are methods of pro-
cedure in criminal cases, and nothing more.
Dwight, Trial By Impeachment, 6 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 257, 261 (1867)
[hereinafter cited as Dwight, Trial By Impeachment].
11. Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 12 (1926)
[hereinafter cited as Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy].
12. "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Convic-
tion of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
13. Although there was no provision for impeachment in the Articles of
Confederation, by the time of the Constitutional Convention, several
states had provided for the impeachment of certain officers. The im-
peachment took place in the lower legislative house, with the trials
to be conducted in the upper house. See 1 D. WATSON, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES--ITS HISTORY, APPLICATION AND CONSTRUC-
TION 207 (1910).
14. "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office
of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party con-
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made in the vote required to convict. Whereas a majority vote of
the Lords was required in Great Britain, most American state con-
stitutions require a two-thirds vote.1 5 If a simple majority were
sufficient to convict, the official would be placed too much at the
mercy of the opposition party. At common law, unanimity in a
jury verdict is required. Therefore, a two-thirds vote seems a
reasonable intermediate position between unanimity and a mere
majority.16
In summary, the American framers adopted some of the
structural and procedural aspects of the British impeachment
process but also made significant changes in seeking to avoid abuses
and shortcomings they saw in the process, the most significant of
which was to separate impeachment from any regular criminal pro-
ceedings. Despite the arguments of various defendants, impeach-
ment in the United States is not a criminal proceeding, but a
procedure for removing an unfit person from office.
1 7
Ill. THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT EXPERIENCE
The House of Representatives has adopted articles of impeach-
ment against twelve federal officers.' 8 The trials of eleven were
victed shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
cl. 7.
15. "The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When
the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall pre-
side: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of
two-thirds of the Members present." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. See
also note 7 supra.
16. It has been argued that if the evidence of wrongdoing is not sufficient
to convince two-thirds of the court of impeachment, it is too infirm
to justify a conviction. Story, Public Officials, supra note 6, at 50.
17. The subjects of numerous impeachment proceedings, the most recent
example being former President Richard Nixon, have sought to blur
the distinctions between impeachment in Great Britain and the United
States, most often in terms of the "criminal" nature of the proceeding
and the issue of what constitutes impeachable offenses. Theodore
Dwight and others have been used as sources for a "conservative" or
"strict constructionist" view of the impeachment process as a strictly
criminal proceeding, requiring the showing of indictable offenses.
This point of view has not won wide acceptance. See note 50 and
accompanying text infra.
18. A thirteenth official, Judge Mark Delahay, was reportedly impeached
by the House in 1873. The House voted to impeach him for improper
personal habits without adopting any specific articles of impeachment.
The articles were to have been drawn and presented during the next
session of Congress, but no further proceedings ever took place.
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conducted by the Senate. The first American ever impeached was
William Blount, a Tennessee Senator. Following his impeachment
by the House in 1797, the Senate voted to expel him, but concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to convict him. From this evolved the
general principle that judges and certain executive officers, but not
legislators, are subject to impeachment. Nine federal judges have
been impeached, four were convicted, 19 four acquitted, 20 and one
allowed to resign to escape trial.2 1 Two executive officers have
been impeached, President Johnson in 1868 and Secretary of War
Belknap in 1876, but both were acquitted.
On the state level, seven governors have been impeached and
removed from office. 22 Charles Robinson of Kansas was brought
to trial in 1862, but was acquitted. Governor Ames of Mississippi
was impeached in 1876, but was allowed to resign to escape trial.
Following the Civil War, impeachment seemed to be developing into
a tool for subordinating the executive to a dominant legislative
faction. Governors Harrison Reed of Florida, Powell Clayton of
Arkansas, and Henry Warmoth of Louisiana were impeached during
the reconstruction period, but were not removed from office since
their trials were not carried out.2
3
In 1929 the Louisiana house adopted articles of impeachment
against Governor Huey P. Long. Two days after the trial began
in the senate, the charges were suddenly dropped after fifteen sena-
tors signed a document stating that they would vote for acquittal
regardless of the evidence. 24
Oklahoma is the one state where impeachment has gained the
most practice and acceptance. In its first twenty-three years of
statehood, thirteen impeachment messages were sent from the
house to the senate. Governor Williams, who held office from 1914
to 1918, was the only one of six elected governors in a row against
Therefore, it is questionable whether Delahay was actually impeached.
See 65 Nw. L. REV. 719 n.2 (1970).
19. John Pickering (1803); West H. Humphreys (1862); Robert W. Arch-
bald (1912); Halsted L. Ritter (1936). See I. BRANT, IMPEAcHMENT-
TRiALs AND ERRORs 201-02 (1972).
20. Samuel Chase (1804); James H. Peck (1826); Charles Swayne (1903);
Harold Louderback (1932). Id.
21. George W. English (1926). Id. at 201.
22. William Holden, North Carolina (1871); David Butler, Nebraska
(1871); Alexander H. Davis, Mississippi (1876); William Sulzer, New
York (1913); James E. Ferguson, Texas (1917); John C. Walton, Okla-
homa (1923); Henry S. Johnston, Oklahoma (1929). J. KALLENBACH,
THE AMERICAN CHIEF ExEcuTmVE 205-08 (1966).
23. Id. at 206-08.
24. Id. at 206.
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whom investigations were not ordered, and he may have been
spared by the unusual house of representatives rule which de-
clared any members guilty of perjury who swore to charges that
were not substantiated in an investigation.25
The Oklahoma experience is clearly the exception and not the
rule. Indeed, the relatively infrequent use of the impeachment
procedure over the past two hundred years has led to uncertainty.
about it.
IV. THE FERGUSON IMPEACHMENT
The political career of James E. Ferguson of Texas is an
excellent case study of the impeachment process in the states since
many of the questions and controversies concerning impeachment
were dealt with by the courts at some time during his career.26
He was first elected governor in 1914 and was re-elected in 1916.
His major political troubles lay in his policies toward the state
university. Viewing his own sixth-grade education as having been
sufficient, Ferguson believed it more advantageous to spend large
amounts of money on a general education to help many citizens
than to spend it on a higher education, which would benefit only
a minority.2 7
Even more disturbing from the university's viewpoint was
Ferguson's idea of its "political" position. He disagreed with the
philosophies of several instructors and attempted to have them
dismissed; he removed one member of the board of regents,
and forced two others to resign; and he vetoed the university
appropriations bill.
On July 23, 1917, the house speaker issued a call to assemble
the representatives on August 1 to consider the governor's impeach-
25. For an interesting examination of the unusual impeachment experience
in Oklahoma, see Ewing, Impeachment of Oklahoma Governors, 24
A . POL. Sci. REV. 648-52 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Ewing, Im-
peachment of OkZahoma Governors].
26. Ferguson gave substance to the popular American illusion of
the equality of opportunity, and proved, beyond reasonable
doubt, that a man might make his mark in the world without
the pampering and enervating influences of wealth and social
position, if only he had the will to succeed.
Ewing, The Impeachment of James E. Ferguson, 48 PoL. SCL Q. 184
(1933) [hereinafter cited as Ewing, Impeachment of Ferguson]. The
governor began his life as a laborer, and later had a career in bank-
ing and ranching. When he was elected governor, it appeared that
at last the common man had a champiorL
27. Id. at 185.
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ment. Ferguson labeled this proposed assembly unconstitutional,
since neither the speaker nor a member of either house had the
legal power to convene the legislature, which could only be called
into special session by the governor. He claimed that any actions
taken would be invalid. When it seemed apparent that his oppo-
nents would assemble in numbers sufficient to constitute a quorum,
he issued a call for a special session of the legislature to meet on
the same day as the one called by the house speaker 28 in order
to consider the university appropriations bill which he had vetoed
a month earlier. The legislature convened pursuant to both calls
and immediately instituted impeachment proceedings.2
9
By issuing his own call for a special session, the governor avoided
the constitutional issue as to whether the legislature could assemble
upon its own call to consider the impeachment of a public official.
The assistant attorney general for Texas issued an opinion during
the Ferguson proceedings which dealt with this issue and implied
that the judicial powers of the house in regard to impeachment
were not controlled by limitations regarding legislative sessions.
3 0
The opposing view was presented by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Simpson v. Hill,31 the only case which directly involved
an attempt by a state legislature to convene itself to consider the
impeachment of an officer. That court held that just as a group
of individuals cannot "convene" themselves as a grand jury, so too
the house had no inherent authority to convene itself to consider
impeachment.3 2 This decision was based not only on an interpreta-
28. Ogg, Impeachment of Governor Ferguson, 12 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 112
(1918).
29. Ewing, Impeachment of Ferguson, supra note 26, at 198.
30. If therefore, the power is judicial, and the Houses act as inde-
pendent units of the Legislature, it would be difficult to
imagine any reason why this independent judicial power
should be in any wise controlled by an agency of the legis-
lative power, or any agency of the executive power, and yet
this would be the inevitable result if it were true that the
House may act for impeachment purposes only upon submis-
sion by the Governor.
[1916-1918] TEx. ATr'V GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 433.
31. 128 Okla. 269, 263 P. 635 (1927). A petition had been signed by a
majority of the members of the Oklahoma house calling for such a
special session. John A. Simpson, a resident taxpayer, sought an in-junction prohibiting the house from convening itself and incurring any
expenses.
32. The House of Representatives, as one of the co-ordinate
branches of the legislative department of the state govern-
ment, when the Legislature is convened and organized as pro-
vided by law, can exercise inquisitorial powers, and at no
other time, and the charges, if any are preferred, must be pre-
ferred by such House of Representatives.
Id. at 272, 263 P. at 639.
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tion of the constitutionally granted powers of the legislative and
executive branches, but also upon the precedent of previous im-
peachment proceedings.3"
Although not directly involving the question of a legislature con-
vening itself for the purposes of impeachment, Walker v. Baker34
has been cited as authority for denying the assembly that power.
In that case, the Texas Senate convened itself in 1946 into special
session to consider recess appointments made by the governor.
Walker had a contract with the state to print the senate journal
and he printed it for this special session. The state refused to pay
for the printing costs, claiming that the senate had no power to
convene itself. Walker brought suit to compel the state to pay.
The Texas Supreme Court held that since the senate had no author-
ity to convene itself, the session was invalid, and the state could
not be compelled to pay Walker for the journals printed. Walker
had cited the distinction made in Ferguson v. Maddox 35 between
legislative and judicial functions, 36 arguing that neither impeach-
ment nor the confirmation of appointees was a legislative function,
but a judicial one, and the house could convene itself to consider
these matters. The court dismissed this argument as not determi-
native of the issue involved. 7 The general consensus now is that
without statutory or constitutional provision,38 the house has no
33. During the lengthy oral argument, in the instant case, sev-
eral times able counsel were asked if, during the history of the
government of the American states, any Legislature was ever
convened in extraordinary session for inquisitorial purposes or
otherwise except upon order of the chief executive. No case
was cited by counsel where inquisitorial authority was exer-
cised by the Legislature in extraordinary session, except when
it had been convened by the proclamation of the Governor.
Id. at 274, 263 P. at 640.
34. 145 Tex. 121, 196 S.W.2d 324 (1946).
35. 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924).
36. For a discussion of this distinction, see note 55 infra.
37. Chief Justice Alexander in his dissent expressed the belief that consti-
tutional restrictions on the subject matter and calling of special ses-
sions did not apply to non-legislative matters. This remains a minor-
ity viewpoint. "The fact that the Constitution provides that the legis-
lature may meet for legislative purposes only at certain intervals is
by no means a limitation upon the authority of the Senate to meet
at other times for the purpose of performing a non-legislative func-
tion." 145 Tex. at 139, 196 S.W.2d at 334.
38. If at any time when the Legislature is not in session, a ma-jority of all the members elected to the house of representa-
tives shall certify in writing to the secretary of state their de-
sire to meet to consider the impeachment of the governor,
lieutenant-governor, or other officer administering the office
of governor, it shall be the duty of the secretary of state im-
mediately to notify the speaker of the house, who shall within
ten days after the receipt of such notice, summon the members
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power to convene itself to consider impeachment.39
In the case of Governor Ferguson, after he was impeached at
a special session called by him for another purpose, the senate con-
victed him on ten of twenty-one charges. He attempted to avoid
this judgment by resigning on September 24, 1917. The senate
nevertheless rendered its judgment on the next day, declaring that
he was removed from the governorship and disqualified from ever
again holding an office of public trust in Texas.
Ferguson did not cease his political activity. Seven years after
his impeachment and removal from office, he announced his can-
didacy for the Texas governorship. Members of the state Demo-
cratic Executive Committee filed suit to enjoin placing his name on
the primary ballot. On his part, Ferguson claimed that four aspects
of his impeachment and conviction had been unlawful, thus making
the entire proceeding void: 1) the senate's judgment of disqualifi-
cation had occurred after he had resigned from office; 2) the con-
stitution did not specify what were impeachable offenses; 3) the
proceeding took place at a special legislative session called by him
for another purpose; and 4) the time of the session ran out before
the completion of the trial, and conviction came at a subsequent
special session. The court rejected each of the claims. 40  In the
following sections the court's decision will be reviewed, and the
cases of other jurisdictions will be examined in relation to the
claims made by Ferguson.
A. Is Resignation or the End of a Term a Bar to Impeachment? 41
Although the court rejected this issue, in any consideration of it
a distinction must be drawn between those jurisdictions where con-
of the house, by publication in some newspaper published at
the Capitol, to assemble at the Capitol on a day to be fixed
by the speaker.
ALA. CONST. art. 7, § 173.
39. For a discussion of this question see Van Hecke, Impeachment of Gov-
ernor at Special Session, 3 Wis. L. REv. 155 (1925).
40. 114 Tex. 85, 263 S.W. 888 (1924).
41. On no admissible theory could this resignation impair thejurisdiction or power of the court to render judgment. The
subject matter was within its jurisdiction. It had jurisdiction
of the person of the Governor; it had heard the evidence and
declared him guilty. Its power to conclude the proceedings
and enter judgment was not dependent upon the will or act
of the Governor .... If the Senate only had the power to
remove from office, it might be said, with some show of rea-
son, that it should not have proceeded further when the Gov-
ernor, by anticipation performed, as it were, its impendingjudgment. But under the Constitution the Senate may not
only remove the offending official; it may disqualify him from
IMPEACHMENT
viction can result in removal and disqualification and those in which
conviction brings only removal from office.42 Generally, where
the judgment goes no further than removal from office, resignation
or the end of a term ends the proceeding, since the offender can no
longer be removed from office.43 This position is consistent with
the theory that the most important objective of impeachment is
removal of the official from his position of public trust. In most
constitutions, however, the judgment of the senate carries with it
an additional penalty, disqualification from ever again holding
office in that particular state. In this situation, resignation or the
end of a term would not terminate an impeachment proceeding,
since disqualification is an additional goal of the process.44
holding further office, and with relation to this latter matter
his resignation is wholly immaterial. For their protection the
people should have the right to remove from public office an
unfaithful official. It is equally necessary for their protection
that the offender should be denied an opportunity to sin
against them a second time. The purpose of the constitutional
provision may not be thwarted by an eleventh-hour resigna-
tion.
Id. at 99, 263 S.W. 893.
42. From the tenor of current discussions it would appear that
many members of Congress, to say nothing of the general
public, assume that the liability of an official to impeachment
somehow terminates the instant he leaves office, whether
through expiration of his term or through resignation. Such
an assumption has no substantial historical foundation and is
not supported by a single authoritative and unequivocable de-
cision of recent times.
Bestor, Book Review, 49 WAsE. L. REv. 255, 277 (1973).
43. If then there must be a judgment of removal from office, it
would seem to follow that the Constitution contemplated that
the party was still in office at the time of the impeachment.
If he was not, his offense was still liable to be tried and pun-
ished in the ordinary tribunals of justice. And it might be
argued, with some force, that it would be a vain exercise of
authority to try a delinquent for an impeachable offense,
when the most important object for which the remedy was
given was no longer necessary or attainable.
1 . STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITrON OF THE UNITED STATES,
586 (1891) [hereinafter cited as STORY, CoMMEn1nNT/mEs].
44. Nebraska has had no cases involving a resignation or the end of a term
of office during an impeachment proceeding, but there have been three
instances of impeachment proceedings begun after the expiration of
the official's term. In April, 1893, articles of impeachment were
adopted by the house against John E. Hill, former state treasurer, and
Thomas H. Benton, former auditor of public accounts, whose terms of
office had already expired. The cases were consolidated, since they
presented the same question. In dismissing the proceedings, the court
held that "[e]x-officials are not civil officers within the meaning of
the Constitution. Jurisdiction to impeach attaches at the time the of-
fense is committed and continues during the time the offender remains
in office, but not longer." State v. Hill, 37 Neb. 80, 86, 55 N.W. 794,
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In summary, an impeachment proceeding, once begun, cannot
be thwarted by a resignation or the end of a term of office, if the
house or senate wishes to continue, and if the judgment of the court
includes both removal from office and disqualification. Once an
official's term has ended, however, and he returns to private life,
few would grant the house the power to initiate impeachment
proceedings.
45
B. What are Impeachable Offenses?
Ferguson alleged that the judgment of the senate was invalid
because at the time it was rendered, neither the Texas Constitution
nor any Texas statute defined the specific acts for which an indi-
vidual could be impeached.
The question of what constitutes an impeachable offense has
been central to nearly every impeachment proceeding in the United
States. There are two basic points of view on this. 46  At one
extreme is the contention that impeachment is limited to indictable
criminal offenses. This point of view has been expressed primarily
by those who are the subjects of an impeachment proceeding.
James D. St. Clair and other attorneys for President Nixon argued
for this "strict" interpretation of the grounds for impeachment.
The acquittal of President Johnson over a century ago strongly
indicates that the Senate has refused to adopt a broad view of
'other high crimes and misdemeanors' as a basis for impeaching a
President. The most salient lesson to be learned from the Johnson
trial is that impeachment of a President should be resorted to only
for cases of the gravest kind-the commission of a crime named in
the Constitution or a criminal offense against the laws of the
United States. If there is any doubt as to the gravity of an of-
fense or as to a President's conduct or motives, the doubt should
be resolved in his favor. This is the necessary price for having
an independent Executive.47
796 (1893). In the same year, the Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed
impeachment proceedings against William Leese, a former attorney
general. State v. Leese, 37 Neb. 92, 55 N.W. 798 (1893). When the
articles were adopted, he had been out of office for more than two
years, since his term had expired. The court held that Leese was not
subject to impeachment for misdemeanors which he may have com-
mitted while in office over two years earlier.
45. Rankin, Is There a Time Limit for Impeachments?, 28 Am. POL. Sci.
REv. 868 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Rankin, Is There a Time Limit
for Impeachment?].
46. Morgan, Eastman, Gale & Areen, Impeachment: An Historical Over-
view, 5 SETow HALL L. REV. 689, 712 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Morgan, Impeachment: An Historical Overview].
47. St. Clair, An Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Presidential
Impeachment, 10 WEEKLY COMPLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
283 (1974).
IMPEACHMENT
At the other extreme is the comment made by Gerald Ford,
when he was proposing the impeachment of Supreme Court Justice
Douglas.
I have studied the principal impeachment actions that have been
initiated over the years and frankly, there are too few cases to
make very good law. About the only thing the authorities can
agree upon in recent history, though it was hotly argued up to
President Johnson's impeachment and the trial of Judge Swayne,
is that an offense need not be indictable to be impeachable. In
other words, something less than a criminal act or criminal dere-
liction of duty may nevertheless be sufficient grounds for im-
peachment and removal from public office.
What, then, is an impeachable offense?
The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is
whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers to
be at a given moment in history: conviction results from what-
ever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to
be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.
Again, the historical context and political climate are important;
there are few fixed principles among the handful of precedents. 48
Most impeachment proceedings inevitably narrow to this ques-
tion of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Since the Texas
,Constitution contained no specific grounds for removal, nor any
definition of impeachable offenses, Ferguson in his case argued that
an impeachment under such a situation was ex post facto, since
an officer could not know in advance that his acts would come
within the scope of impeachable offenses, and since the senate was
the sole judge of its own jurisdiction. The court in rejecting this
argument did not see itself as unleashing a legislative monster
which would forever place the judicial and executive branches at
its feet. Rather, they interpreted the constitutional provisions and
the historical precedents as evidence that impeachment does not
require an indictable offense.49
48. 116 CoNG. REC. 11913 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Gerald Ford). Ford
reaffirmed his belief in this "broad" definition of impeachable offenses
at the time of his confirmation hearings upon nomination to the Vice
Presidency, but as the impeachment of President Nixon became more
of a possibility, Ford's views changed markedly. See Hearings on the
Nomination of Gerald R. Ford to the Office of Vice President Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d CONG., 1st Sess., at 140-
41 (1973). But see N.Y. Times, July 28, 1974, at 37, col 3-4. Then
Vice President Ford's previously expressed belief in whatever the ma-jority considered to be an impeachable offense was abandoned follow-
ing a 27-11 vote of the House Judiciary Committee, recommending the
impeachment of President Nixon. The majority vote included six Re-
publican congressmen. Charging that the impeachment inquiry had
become a partisan issue, Ford argued that the facts as he knew them
did not reveal any impeachable offenses.
49. [W]hile impeachable offenses are not defined in the Constitu-
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Those who adopt the view that impeachment requires an indict-
able offense5" arguably have failed to distinguish properly the
impeachment experience in the United States, where the judg-
ment of the impeachment court is limited to removal from office
and disqualification, from that in Great Britain,51 where impeach-
ment was another mode of criminal procedure.
The Nebraska Supreme Court accepted the "broad" view of the
tion, they are very clearly designated or pointed out by the
term 'impeachment,' which at once connotes the offenses to
be considered and the procedure for the trial thereof .... It
was designed, primarily, to reach those in high places guilty
of official delinquencies or maladministration. It was settled
that the wrongs justifying impeachment need not be statutory
offenses or common-law offenses, or even offenses against any
positive law. Generally speaking, they were designated as
high crimes and misdemeanors which, in effect, meant nothing
more than grave official wrongs.
114 Tex. at 96, 263 S.W. at 892.
50. Professor Theodore W. Dwight of Columbia Law School and Justice
Benjamin R. Curtis, who served for six years on the United States Su-
preme Court under Chief Justice Taney, are the two most prominent
sources for this position and are often referred to by defendants in
impeachment proceedings. In comparing impeachment in Great Brit-
ain and the United States, Dwight concluded:
[M]any seem to think that a public officer can be impeached
for a mere act of indecorum. On the contrary, he must have
committed a true crime, not against the law of England but
against the law of the United States. An impeachment is
nothing but a mode of trial, the Constitution only adopts it
as a mode of procedure, leaving the crimes to which it is to
be applied to be settled by the general rules of criminal law.
Dwight, Trial by Impeachment, supra note 10, at 268.
Justice Curtis, after retiring from the Supreme Court, served as an
attorney for President Johnson during his impeachment trial. Curtis
felt that since the phrase "other high crimes and misdemeanors" was
included with treason and bribery as grounds for impeachment, it
must signify an indictable crime as serious as treason or bribery.
"There can be no crime, there can be no misdemeanor, without a law.
.... There must be some law; otherwise there is no crime."
Ethridge, The Law of Impeachment, 8 Miss. L.J. 301 (1936).
One weakness in Curtis' argument is that the same words can be
used to portray a vastly different point of view. The same constitu-
tional provisions have been interpreted in another light:
[I]t appears that the phrase 'high crimes and misdemeanors'
means only that such offenses are high in the sense that they
are perpetrated against the highest interests of the State and
by persons occupying high places in its service; for any person
can commit a heinous crime, but only a person holding a high
place can commit a high crime. Therefore the act may be a
high crime though not even criminal nor unusual.
Jackson, The Swayne Impeachment Proceedings, 10 VA. L. REG. 1077
(1905).
51. See Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment, 6 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 641
(1867) [hereinafter cited as Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment].
IMPEACHMENT
grounds for impeachment in State v. Hastings.52 Justifying this
position is the fact that many of the impeachment trials in the
states have been based in whole or in part on offenses which are
not punishable by law.58
The conclusion to be reached by examining federal and state
cases is that impeachable offenses need not be indictable offenses.
If this were not so, it would be impossible to foresee and define
in advance by statute all of the possible subjects of impeachment.
This does not mean that the senate has unlimited and arbitrary
freedom to destroy the careers of honest public servants. It may
do nothing until the house acts. Then its members are under oath
to perform their duties with fairness, and conviction requires a two-
52. 37 Neb. 96, 55 N.W. 774 (1893).
It is sufficient for our purpose at present to say that we are
constrained to reject the views of Professor Dwight, Judge
Curtis, and other advocates of the doctrine that an impeach-
able misdemeanor is necessarily an indictable offense, as too
narrow and tending to defeat rather than promote the end for
which impeachment as a remedy was designed and not in har-
mony with the fundamental rules of constitutional construc-
tion.
Id. at 114, 55 N.W. at 780.
53. Nearly half of the charges brought against Governor Ferguson in-
volved something less than a criminal violation. Governor Walton of
Oklahoma was convicted and removed from office in 1923 for such
"political" offenses as abuse of the pardoning power, abuse of the
power to declare martial law, and the improper use of the militia to
prevent the assembling of the legislature. Potts, Impeachment as a
Remedy, supra note 11, at 25.
In 1929, the Oklahoma House had adopted eleven articles of im-
peachment against Governor Johnston. Ten contain specific charges;
one was an article of "general incompetency." The general arti-
cle was presented first and received the necessary two-thirds vote;
none of the ten remaining specific articles were adopted. He was
thus impeached because of "general incompetency," yet no spe-
cific act received the necessary two-thirds vote. Ewing, Impeachment
of Oklahoma Governors, supra note 25, at 651.
The impeachment of former Federal Judge Halsted Ritter followed
a similar pattern. He was acquitted by the Senate of charges involv-
ing income tax evasion, but was convicted under an article charging
that his conduct had brought the court into scandal and disrepute to
the prejudice of public confidence in the judiciary. Ritter was con-
victed and removed from office despite the fact that no specific allega-
tion received a two-thirds vote of the Senate. R. BERGER, IMPEACH-
MENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 56-57 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as BERGER].
Of the twelve federal officers impeached by the House of Repre-
sentatives, only one was impeached solely on grounds which constitute
a criminal offense. Morgan, Impeachment: An Historical Overview,
aupra note 46, at 718. See also Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, su-
pra note 11, at 32-33.
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thirds vote. The defendant is granted all of the procedural guaran-
tees necessary for a fair trial. Therefore, although strictly speak-
ing, an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the house
and two-thirds of the senate think it is, it is much more.54
C. Do the Limitations on the Legislation and Time of
Sessions Apply to Impeachments?
James Ferguson alleged that his impeachment was invalid since
it occurred at a special session called by him to consider the Uni-
versity of Texas appropriations bill and that at a special session
the house could consider only those matters presented to it by the
governor. The court rejected this argument by drawing a distinc-
tion between the legislative and judicial functions of the house and
senate.55 The court also held that the house and senate could ex-
ercise their impeachment powers at all times when they were con-
vened. No one had argued that these powers could not be exercised
during a regular session; therefore, the court ruled that unless the
constitution expressly forbade it, the impeachment powers could
also be exercised at a special session, whatever the purpose for its
call. 6
54. [A]n impeachable high crime or misdemeanor is one in its na-
ture or consequences subversive of some fundamental or es-
sential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the
public interest, and this may consist of a violation of the Con-
stitution, of law, of an official oath, or duty, by an act com-
mitted or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by the
abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives or for
an improper purpose.
Lawrence, The Law of Impeachment, supra note 51, at 680.
55. Each, in the plainest language, is given separate plenary
power and jurisdiction in relation to matters of impeachment:
the House, the power to 'impeach,' that is, to prefer charges;
the Senate the power to 'try' those charges. These powers are
essentially judicial in their nature. Their proper exercise does
not, in the remotest degree, involve any legislative function.
114 Tex. at 93-94, 263 S.W. at 890.
56. A Texas Attorney General Opinion issued at the same time reached the
conclusions the court did. It argued that the framers understood that
the governor would be slow to recommend his own impeachment;
therefore, they would not have placed control of the time and circum-
stances of such a proceeding in his hands. It also focused on the dis-
tinction between the legislative and judicial functions of the assembly.
The fact that this general jurisdiction is proposed to be exer-
cised at a special session and the fact that the subject thereof
has not been submitted by the Governor, we think, do not at
all detract from the power of the House. This proceeds, in-
evitably, we think, from the grant of power in all-embracing
terms plus the necessarily incidental authority to do what
may be essential to the complete exercise of the power ex-
pressly granted. That the limitations placed upon the activity
of either or both of the two Houses, at a special session, by
the Constitution refer to the exercise of the power of legisla-
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Ferguson also advanced the position that his impeachment and
removal were invalid because the senate proceedings were divided
between two special sessions. 57 The Court held that this did not
invalidate them.5 8
In most state constitutions, restrictions on the time limits and
the subjects of sessions of the legislature refer not to the "house"
and "senate" individually, but to the "legislature" and "legislative
functions." Arguably these restrictions apply only to the legislature
as a whole, when acting in a legislative capacity, and not to the
non-legislative matter of impeachment.
Generally, although neither house of the legislature can convene
itself to consider the impeachment of an officer, impeachment can
be a subject for consideration at any special session as well as any
regular session of 'the legislature and the time limits on legislative
sessions do not apply to impeachment proceedings.
D. Does the Pardoning Power Apply to npeachments?
In Ferguson v. Maddox, the Texas court upheld the decision of
Democratic party officials to keep Ferguson's name off the primary
ballot for the 1924 election. Shortly afterward, his wife became
a candidate for governor. Charles M. Dickson, a Texas voter, filed
a suit to enjoin the placing of her. name on the general election
ballot. He alleged that she was ineligible as the wife of the
impeached governor, because if elected, she would be a figurehead
and her husband would actually be making public policy.
The court rejected these claims,59 holding that the evidence was
insufficient to establish any conspiracy to use Mrs. Ferguson's name
as a subterfuge to escape the effect of the impeachment decree.
Subsequently, she was elected and one of her first accomplishments
was passage of the Amnesty Act of 1925, which provided for a re-
lease of all offenses for which any officer was impeached and con-
tion and have no application to the use of the impeaching au-
thority, we think, is clear from a consideration of the nature
of the power and of the machinery provided for its exercise.
[1916-1918] TSxAs ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 431.
57. The proceedings began at the special session called by the governor,
but the time for this session expired on August 30, 1917. The acting
governor issued a call for another special session, which convened on
August 31, 1917 and resumed the impeachment inquiry.
58. "The Constitution creates the court; it does not prescribe for it any
particular tenure, or limit the time of its existence. By indubitable
reason and logic it must have power and authority to sit until the full
and complete accomplishment of the purpose for which it was cre-
ated." 114 Tex. at 96, 263 S.W. at 891.
59. 114 Tex. 176, 265 S.W. 1012 (1924).
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victed by the Texas Senate and cancellation of any punishment re-
sulting from impeachment.6 0
Several years later, Ferguson filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the state Democratic Executive Committee to certify him
as a candidate for governor. The Texas Supreme Court, in
Ferguson v. Wilcox,6 denied this request, and in so doing, declared
the Amnesty Act of 1925 unconstitutional for two reasons. 62 The
power to grant pardons was constitutionally vested with the execu-
tive and could not be assumed by another branch of the govern-
ment, and impeachments were expressly excepted from the pardon-
ing power.63
Whereas in Great Britain the sentence upon conviction in an
impeachment trial often included fines, imprisonment, or in rare
cases, death, the judgment in the United States results in removal
from office and disqualification; thus there is little "humane" need
for clemency. Furthermore, if the power to pardon were extended
to impeachments, they might become ineffective as a protection
against political offenses.6 4
V. THE SULZER AND BUTLER IMPEACHMENTS
The impeachment proceedings against Governor Sulzer of New
60. Law of March 31, 1925, ch. 184, §§ 1-2, [1925] TEX. AcTs 454-55. There
was little question as to the intent of the lawmakers in approving this
act. "As a matter of fact, Ferguson was the only person to whom the
release could apply." Ewing, Impeachment of Ferguson, supra note
26, at 209.
61. 119 Tex. 280, 28 S.W.2d 526 (1930).
62. It is unreasonable, if not unbelievable, in our opinion, that
the convention, after providing for the disqualification of a
convicted officer in impeachment to thereafter hold any office
of honor, trust, or profit under the state, and after excepting
from the pardon power granted to the chief executive those
convicted of impeachment, ever intended that the legislature
by mere implication could wholly abrogate and render nuga-
tory the plain provisions of the Constitution providing for
such disqualification.
Id. at 296-97, 28 S.W.2d at 534.
63. Five of the original state constitutions specifically granted the general
assembly the power to pardon in cases of impeachment. Van Hecke,
Pardons in Impeachment Cases, 24 MicH. L. REv. 657, 665 (1926)
[hereinafter cited as Van Hecke, Pardons in Impeachment Cases].
Only Tennessee has such a provision at the present time. "The Legis-
lature now has, and shall continue to have, power to relieve from the
penalties imposed, any person disqualified from holding office by the
judgment of a Court of Impeachment." TENN. CoNsT. art. 5, § 4. No
state constitution grants such a power to the governor; indeed, most
deny the power to pardon in such cases.
64. See Van Hecke, Pardons in Impeachment Cases, supra note 63, at 659-
60.
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York and Governor Butler of Nebraska illustrate two other impor-
tant questions about the process of impeachment: Can an official
be impeached for acts committed during a previous term of office?
Does the adoption of articles of impeachment by the house mean
the automatic suspension of the accused from his position? Each
of these questions was answered affirmatively by the New York
and Nebraska courts.
A. Can an Official be Impeached for Acts Committed
During a Previous Term of Office? 65
When David Butler of Nebraska was impeached, several of the
articles dealt with acts committed during his first term as governor.
His attorneys argued that he could not be impeached for such acts
because the people, in re-electing him, had acquitted him of his
alleged misdeeds. The house, nevertheless, declared that its author-
ity to impeach was not limited to acts committed during the instant
term, because the objective to be attained by an impeachment was
still valid.66
The concept of an officer's liability for misdeeds in a previous
term of office was carried even further in the impeachment of Gov-
ernor Sulzer. Of the eight articles of impeachment adopted, three
related to alleged conduct engaged in while he was a candidate for
the office, or after his election but before the beginning of his
term.67 His eventual conviction meant that he was removed from
office for acts committed before the beginning of his term.
65. There have been at least three examples of state officials impeached
during their second term for offenses committed during their first term
of office. In 1853, Judge Hubbell of Wisconsin was impeached for of-
fenses committed during his first term; in 1875, George C. Barnard was
re-elected a justice of the highest tribunal in New York and immedi-
ately thereafter was impeached partially on the basis of misconduct
during a previous term. Rankin, Is There a Time Limit in Impeach-
ment Cases?, supra note 45, at 659-60.
66. "This same man, David Butler, is still in the office which he has held
for five or six years. He is still in the office, from which you can
remove him. Is it reasonable to hold that the mere swinging of a
pendulum past a certain hour, on a certain day, is to determine this
matter?" IM.PEACMENT TRTAL or DAVID BUTLER, supra note 5, at 43.
Butler was convicted only upon the article charging him with unlaw-
fully appropriating $16,881.26 of state money for his own use during
his first term of office.
A section of the Enabling Act of 1864 promised to the State of
Nebraska five percent of all the proceeds of the sale of federal lands
within the state boundaries. A draft was issued by the federal govern-
ment, payable to David Butler, Governor, in the amount of $16,881.26.
The senate concluded that this amount had been unlawfully appropri-
ated by the governor.
67. Thurber & Thomas, Some Legal Questions Involved in the Impeach-
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The Iowa Supreme Court has also held that election or re-
election does not acquit an official of previous misdeeds. 68
The very object of removal is to rid the community of a corrupt,
incapable, or unworthy official. His acts during his previous term
quite as effectually stamp him as much as those of that he may be
serving. Re-election does not condone the offense. Misconduct
may not have been discovered prior to the election. 69
The Alabama Constitution may present a possible exception to
this general rule by limiting the judgment of the senate to removal
and disqualification only for the term for which the officer was
elected. In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Hasty,70 the Alabama
Supreme Court said:
If an officer is impeached and removed, there is nothing to pre-
vent his being elected to the identical office from which he was
removed for a subsequent term, and, this being true, a re-election
to the office would operate as a condonation under the Constitu-
tion of the officer's conduct during the previous term, to the ex-
tent of cutting off the right to remove him from the subsequent
term for said conduct during this previous term.71
In states other than Alabama, removal and disqualification are
permanent. The objective of impeachment in these situations is
to insure that a faithless official is prevented from again holding
office. Re-election cannot serve as endorsement or condonation of
unlawful acts in a previous term. To hold this would undercut
the objective of the impeachment process.72
B. Is an Impeached Officer Suspended from Office?
A major controversy arose following the impeachment of
Governor Sulzer concerning who was to exercise the powers of the
office, with Lieutenant Governor Glynn arguing that they imme-
diately devolved upon him. Sulzer, using the precedent of Andrew
Johnson, claimed that he was not relieved of his powers as governor
until convicted.7 3 New York's Attorney General issued an opinion
ment of Governor Sulzer, 6 BENCH & B. 1 (1913).
68. State v. Welsh, 109 Iowa 19, 79 N.W. 370 (1899).
69. Id. at 21, 79 N.W. at 371.
70. 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559 (1941).
71. Id. at 125, 63 So. at 561.
72. "The obvious purpose of the provisions for impeachment would fail
to a considerable degree if such misconduct or mal-administration in
a previous term was not a ground for impeachment." Opinion of the
Justices to the House of Representatives, 308 Mass. 619, 627-28, 33
N.E.2d 275, 279 (1941).
73. He ordered all records of the executive branch placed under lock and
key. The great seal was secured by a chain, and armed guards were
stationed in the corridor adjoining the governor's office. "And so, un-
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before the senate trial declaring that Glynn was "acting governor,"
pending the outcome of the trial. Thereafter, one agency after
another gradually transferred its a1legiance to Glynn, while Sulzer
remained in his office.
Problems resulting from this contest over who was to exercise
the powers of office during an impeachment proceeding are illus-
trated in People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, Warden of Penitentiary.7 4
Robin, a prisoner in a New York penitentiary, seeking release
through habeas corpus proceedings, had a pardon signed by Sulzer,
but it had been signed during the period of the impeachment pro-
ceeding against Sulzer. The court had to determine if Sulzer had
the authority to grant this pardon. In holding that he did not,
the court quoted the section of the New York Constitution which
provides that when a governor is impeached or removed from office,
his powers and duties devolve upon the lieutenant governor, and
explained that this did not infringe on the presumption of inno-
cence. Instead, it was a temporary period of suspension from office,
wherein the accused has the chance to clear his name.
Robin appealed, contending that Sulzer had actual physical
possession of the office, and that his powers remained with him
until a conviction by the senate. In affirming the previous decision,
the court held that mere physical possession of the office was not
enough.75
When the Nebraska House prepared articles of impeachment
against Governor Butler, it requested an advisory opinion from the
Nebraska Supreme Court as to whether this suspended the gover-
nor from office. The court stated that since the question did not
result from actual litigation before it, any informal opinion would
not have the weight of an authoritative opinion; however, it con-
cluded "that it is the law that all the functions of the Governor
are entirely suspended, and devolve upon the secretary of state,
til the Court of Impeachment met, five weeks later, and decided that
the impeachment was legal, there existed the anomalous situation of
a divided state, two men claiming to be the governor and exercising
such duties of the Chief Executive as came within their reach." J.
FIEDnMA, THE ImPEACmVnmr OF GOVERNOR WLLIAwVE SULZER 185 (1939).
74. 143 N.Y.S. 325 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
75. "William Sulzer was Governor de jure, or of right, until he was re-
moved from office; but from the moment of the adoption of the articles
of impeachment he became functus officio; he had discharged all of
the duties permitted by the Constitution; and his powers were at an
end, until the Court for Impeachments had passed upon the charges.
The attempted pardon was issued subsequent to the impeachment, and
could not, therefore, give relator any rights." People ex rel. Robin v.
Hayes, Warden of Penitentiary, 149 N.Y.S. 250, 254 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
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from the time of his impeachment by the House of Representatives,
and during the trial thereof by the Senate.
7 6
The Oklahoma court was confronted with a unique situation in
this area. Upon the impeachment of Governor Walton, the powers
and responsibilities of the office devolved upon Lieutenant Gov-
ernor Trapp. Following Walton's conviction and removal, Trapp
held the office for over two years. He subsequently desired to seek
election to the office, but the Oklahoma Constitution provided that
the governor could not immediately succeed himself. He argued
that he was merely "acting governor," and that as such, he was
not disqualified from running for the office. In Fitzpatrick v.
McAlister77 the court held that Trapp was the actual constitutional
governor and thus could not run for the office.
The constitutions of fourteen states7 8 specifically provide that
in the event of the impeachment of an official, he is immediately
suspended from office until such time as he is acquitted of all
charges by the senate. Even in states having no such provision,
most agree that the best interests of the public demand such a sus-
pension since an officer involved in an impeachment proceeding
cannot maintain the confidence, respect or legitimacy necessary to
function effectively, nor can any branch of government run
smoothly with clouds of uncertainty surrounding it.
This is one aspect of the impeachment process in which the states
have not followed the example of the Federal Government, since
the Federal Constitution contains no provision for the suspension
or removal of an impeached president.79 Andrew Johnson, the
only president ever impeached, remained in office throughout the
proceedings, as did most of the federal judges against whom
76. Opinion of the Judges, 3 Neb. 463 (1872).
77. 121 Okla. 83, 248 P. 569 (1926).
78. FLA. CoNST. art. III, § 17; HAwAu CONST. art. IV, § 4; LA. CONST. art.
IX, § 2; MxcH. CONST. art. XI, § 7; xitNN. CONST. art. XIII § 3; NEB.
CONST. art. III, § 17; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 36; N.Y. CONST. art. VI,
§ 24; R.I. CONST. art. XI, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XV, § 1; S.D. CONST.
art. XVI, § 5; TEx. CONST. art. XV, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 20;
Wis. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1.
79. In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall
then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
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impeachment proceedings took place.8 0
VI. CONCLUSION
Alexander Hamilton spoke of the "awful discretion" of the court
of impeachment in such a "national inquest into the conduct of pub-
lic men."' Impeachment was not intended as a device for attack-
ing a political party or philosophy, or for making the executive and
judiciary subservient to a dominant, partisan legislature. Rather,
it is a last resort means for removing an officer who has violated
the public trust. It is not a "criminal" proceeding, but a political
one.8 2 The defendant is not tried before a judge or a jury of his
peers, but usually before the upper house of the legislature. If con-
victed, he cannot be fined or imprisoned by the court of impeach-
ment. There is no procedure for appealing this court's decision,8 3
80. See Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, supra note 11, at 15-38.
81. THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 359-60 (E. Scott ed.
1894).
82. The judgment of a court of impeachment is limited to removal from
office and disqualification; any fines or prison sentences to be imposed
must come from an independent criminal proceeding. The inde-
pendent nature of the two proceedings was emphasized in Dauphin
County Grant Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 2), 332 Pa. 342, 2
A.2d 802 (1938). A Pennsylvania law had provided that in the event
of an impeachment investigation, any other investigation of the same
charges by another court was to be suspended until the completion
of the house investigation. This act was declared unconstitutional
The delegation to the House of Representatives of the sole
power of impeachment did not have the effect of depriving
the court of its power to continue the investigation in the
existing proceeding of crimes constituting misdemeanor in of-
fice.... The two proceedings are independent of each other
and, as the Declaration of Rights shows, were intended to be
kept independent proceedings. The provision that the accused
shall be liable to indictment 'whether convicted or acquitted'
does not require halting criminal proceedings until after the
impeachment. The provision was probably inserted so that
there might be no doubt that the result of a trial in either
proceeding should not be a bar to the trial in the other.
Id. at 354-55, 2 A.2d at 808.
83. Following his impeachment and conviction, former Federal Judge Hal-
sted Ritter brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover his salary,
contending that his conviction was void because the article in question
did not constitute an impeachable offense. In dismissing the suit, the
court ruled:
We think that when the provision that the Senate should
have 'the sole power to try all impeachments' was inserted in
the Constitution, the word 'sole' was used with a definite
meaning and with the intention that no other tribunal should
have any jurisdiction of the cases tried under the provisions
with reference to impeachment.
Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293, 296 (1936).
114 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
and most constitutions exclude impeachments from the pardoning
power. Critics argue that the process is too slow and cumber-
some,8 4 too expensive,8 5 and too often subject to partisan political
influences. Despite these criticisms,86 there has been no serious,
widespread effort to alter significantly this method of removal.
Speculation about alternatives, such as a vote of confidence, are
not taken seriously, for there is an historical support for even those
parts of the constitution which at times seem awkward or ineffec-
tive.8 7 Perhaps the imperfect, infrequently applied process of
impeachment serves its best purpose by just being available when
needed.
Impeachment is one of the "checks and balances" incorporated
into the American constitutional scheme. The framers feared a
monarchical executive, not subject to the rule of law; therefore,
they provided that the president, as well as other civil officers, was
subject to removal by impeachment. Conviction means removal
Some writers, however, question the final and absolute authority
of the court of impeachment. See Rezneck, Is Judicial Review of Im-
peachment Coming?, 60 A.B.A.J. 681-85 (1974). Citing the changing
'political questions doctrine', Rezneck argues that the Supreme Court
could someday be faced with a constitutional impasse between the
Congress and the President over such a question as impeachment.
84. The most extreme case of delay occurred during the impeachment of
Warren Hastings in Great Britain. The entire proceeding took seven
years, and in the interval between the beginning and the conclusion,
a large majority of the Lords hearing the case died. The proceedings
against Federal Judges English and Peck took two and four years, re-
spectively. See Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, supra note 11, at
32-33.
85. The State of Texas appropriated a total of $325,000 for the Ferguson
impeachment. New York appropriated nearly $250,000 for the Sulzer
impeachment. See Limbaugh, Impeachment, supra note 1, at 6.
86. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. The original Nebraska Con-
stitution (1866) provided that the senate would conduct the impeach-
ment trials, which it did during the proceedings against Governor
David Butler. Four years later the constitution was amended, placing
the responsibility for conducting the trial with the Nebraska Supreme
Court. In 1877, by a joint resolution of the legislature, the records
of Butler's impeachment were expunged from the journals of the house
and senate. The Nebraska court was thus given the power to try im-
peachments over sixty years before the state adopted a one-house leg-
islature, the Unicameral.
87. The controversy surrounding the Electoral College serves as an excel-
lent example. Although there is some discussion at almost every ses-
sion in Congress about altering the method of presidential election, lit-
tle of substance is ever done. There seems to be a hesitancy on the
part of many Americans, legislators included, to make any drastic
changes in the Constitution which has served us for nearly two centur-
ies.
IMPEACHMENT
from office and disqualification from again holding office. An
officer cannot escape impeachment by resignation or the end of his
term, if the legislature is inclined to continue the proceeding, unless
it is in a jurisdiction where the judgment of the senate is limited
to removal only.
There is no magical barrier which prevents officials from being
impeached for their actions in any previous term. Re-election does
not condone or excuse any misdeeds.
Although not the case under the Federal Constitution, in most
states an impeached official is automatically suspended from his
office, pending resolution of the inquiry. The controversy over who
was to exercise the powers of the governor's office during the Sul-
zer proceeding, as well as the speculation about who, if anyone,
was running the executive branch during the last days of the
Nixon administration, serve as examples of why this should be the
practice. No branch of government, nor any individual officer
therein, can function effectively during such a tense, uncertain,
controversial period.
To guard against "legislative tyranny," lawmakers have no
absolute power to remove officials at will. The legislature cannot
convene itself, or meet at any time it wishes, to consider the
impeachment of an officer. The proceedings must take place at
a regular legislative session, or at a duly called special session.
Articles of impeachment must be adopted by at least a majority
vote of the people's representatives, and conviction requires at least
a two-thirds vote. The judgment is limited to removal from office
and in some cases disqualification from again holding office.
Impeachment touches neither the individual's person nor his prop-
erty, but simply divests him of his political responsibility.""
One of the most controversial questions in an impeachment
proceeding is what constitutes an impeachable offense. Although
the precedents and the authorities supporting the necessity for
requiring that there be an indictable offense are few and generally
unpersuasive, such a viewpoint will continue to be espoused so long
as an official is the subject of an impeachment inquiry. The courts
have repeatedly accepted non-indictable offenses as grounds for im-
peachment. As has been shown, the impeachment device is not a
grant to the legislature of absolute power to remove officials at
will. Nor is it a criminal proceeding, requiring evidence of an in-
dictable offense.
To confine impeachable conduct to indictable offenses may well
be to set a standard so restrictive as not to reach conduct that
might adversely affect the system of government. Some of the
88. BERGER, supra note 53, at 80.
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most grievous offenses against our constitutional form of govern-
ment may not entail violations of the criminal law... A re-
quirement of criminality would be incompatible with the intent of
the framers to provide a mechanism broad enough to maintain the
integrity of constitutional government. Impeachment is a consti-
tutional safety valve; to fulfill this function it must be flexible
enough to cope with exigencies not now foreseeable. 9
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89. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTI-
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